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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to deepen and advance our understanding of the de-facto accountability 
processes and practices within Muslim non-governmental organisations (NGOs). We employ 
a three-fold accountability framework of felt, imposed and adaptive accountability, supported 
by insight from the Islamic perspective to elucidate our empirical findings. We adopt this 
framework because it enables us to localise the notions of accountability, allowing a more 
complete understanding of the de-facto nature of Muslim NGO accountability to emerge 
within the context of religious ideals and between accountabilities that are externally imposed 
and those that are internally generated. 
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Exploring de-facto accountability regimes in Muslim NGOs 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper aims to deepen and advance our understanding of the accountability processes and 
practices within Muslim non-governmental organisations (NGOs). To conceptualise this 
process, we draw on a framework comprised of three ‘ideal types’ of non-profit 
accountability regimes, as articulated by O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015), of imposed, felt and 
adaptive accountabilities. An imposed accountability regime is one that comprises “a type of 
formal, external oversight and control imposed on individuals or organisations” (O’Dwyer 
& Boomsma, 2015, p40) and examines how organisations account for their actions in a 
hierarchical manner, usually using strictly defined or quantitative measures (Mulgan, 2000; 
Roberts, 1991; Sinclair, 1995). Felt accountability is more difficult to define. It has links to 
‘personal responsibility’ (Lindkvist & Llewellyn, 2003; Sinclair, 1995), as well as to the 
morality and values held by individuals (Mulgan, 2000). It explores the manner in which 
individuals open themselves up for scrutiny and assess their own performance in relation to 
organisation mission and values (Ebrahim, 2003; Fry, 1995), therefore requiring “that 
organizational actors, such as NGOs and funders, develop a reciprocated sense of 
responsibility that is collectively generated rather than uni-directionally imposed” (Ebrahim, 
2003, p.200). An adaptive accountability regime is a hybrid of the two, seeking to align the 
core features of imposed and felt accountability (Ebrahim, 2009). We adopt this three-fold 
framework because it permits us to localise the meanings of imposed, felt and adaptive 
concepts of accountability (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015), providing a better understanding 
of the dynamic nature of Muslim NGO accountability to emerge within the context of 
religious ideals and between accountabilities that are externally imposed and those that are 
internally generated (Ebrahim, 2003; Ebrahim, 2009). This framework evokes the 
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multifaceted nature of accountability by acknowledging the complicated and continuing 
balancing act in which NGOs must engage (O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Ebrahim, 2003). 
Muslim NGOs are often under constant pressure to provide accountability in some 
form (Belaon, 2014; Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2009) to a wide array of stakeholders, from 
their regulator, the Muslim community (their donors), and the wider society in which they 
operate. The issue of accountability is especially pertinent for Muslim NGOs given the 
sensitive and volatile political environment in which they currently operate (Cordier, 2009). 
These sensitivities include the link often emphasised between Muslim charitable 
organisations and issues of terrorist funding in areas of conflict, particularly across the 
Middle East and Syria (Benthall, 2016). Given these sensitivities, Muslim NGOs argue that 
they are under greater external and media scrutiny than other NGOs, bringing limitations not 
only on their humanitarian activity but also on their ability to be accountable (Belaon, 2014; 
Benthall, 2016; Cordier, 200;). This omission is especially important when considering that 
these religious NGOs operate in a different religious environment than that of their own 
religious affiliation
1
, especially one that has a number of regulatory requirements imposed by 
the Charities legislation not specifically tailored towards religious organisations. However, no 
studies to date have attempted to examine the processes by which Muslim NGOs manage 
these religious and non-religious accountability exigencies.    
The prior literature has focused considerably on various accountability issues in 
secular NGOs and Christian NGOs (Booth, 1993; Ebrahim, 2003, 2009; Hardy & Ballis, 
2005, 2013; Jacobs, 2005; Laughlin, 1990; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a, b). A focus on other 
religious NGOs and, in particular, insight from specific Muslim organisations have largely 
been missing from the literature, with the exception of Abdul-Rahman & Goddard (1998) 
who considered accountability relationships within Malaysian Muslim religious councils. The 
consideration of these ‘other’ organisations is important due to the differing notions and 
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practices of accountability that they might encompass, compared to Christian/Secular notions 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2011; Lewis, 2001, 2006; Tinker, 2004). For such organisations 
operating in the UK, these issues become more nuanced as the organisations attempt to 
balance their religious values and various imposed accountability demands.  
Our paper makes a number of important contributions. First, it seeks to advance the 
present religious organisations’ accountability literature, which is heavily focused on 
Christian organisations, by providing an alternative focus on Muslim organisations. There is 
little empirical evidence regarding how Muslim organisations, especially Muslim NGOs in a 
non-Muslim-dominated environment, report on and adhere to accountability templates and 
whether there exists a dichotomy between the imposed requirements and the religiously 
inspired aspects of felt accountability, as suggested by the prior literature (Booth, 1993; 
Hardy & Ballis, 2013; Laughlin, 1990). In this paper, we elaborate upon these considerations 
and present a conceptualisation of accountability inspired by the Islamic perspective, which 
signifies accountability as a threefold relationship between oneself, God and society and in 
which a person’s relationship with other individuals mirrors his or her relationship with God. 
Furthermore, the previous literature suggests that many de-facto accountability regimes exist 
within religious organisations and communities that complement and significantly enhance 
the legitimacy of organisational practice (see for example Laughlin, 1990 and Jacobs & 
Walker, 2004). Hence, our findings could also make a significant contribution to enhancing 
the understanding of de-facto accountability structures within Muslim NGOs, in addition to 
their de-jure mechanisms of accountability. 
Second, prior research on generic NGO accountability has repeatedly emphasised 
how top-down accountability requirements threaten mission achievement by encouraging 
non-profit managers to concentrate on a narrow range of less risky activities peripheral to the 
organisation’s core mission (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). This paper 
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provides evidence regarding whether similar concerns also exist in religious NGOs and finds, 
amongst other aspects, that regardless of the activities or mission in which the NGO 
ultimately engages, mission and vision will always be compromised if these organisations 
focus on engaging in less risky core activities. For Muslim NGOs, although internal 
accounting and reporting practices have been strengthened by increased top-down scrutiny, 
external activities have been constrained due to the extensive regulatory and media attention 
on them, resulting in the core mission of the NGOs being disrupted because they felt they 
were not fully able to engage with their humanitarian missions in conflict-ravaged areas, such 
as Syria and the Middle East.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section theorises notions 
of accountability and presents the conceptual framework for the study. This section is then 
followed by a discussion of the Islamic ethical perspective on accountability. Section three 
provides background for the development of Muslim NGOs, followed by a brief overview of 
the literature in section four. Section five presents the research methods adopted for the study. 
Section six presents the findings, and the final section provides a discussion and concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Notions of accountability 
This paper utilises a conceptual framework based on three ideal types of accountability 
regimes: imposed, felt and adaptive (Ebrahim, 2009; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015). This 
three-fold framework allows the multifaceted nature of NGO accountability to emerge by 
acknowledging the complicated balancing act that such organisations face in managing de-
jure and de-facto accountability requirements between externally imposed activities and 
internally generated actions (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015).  
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In the prior literature, imposed ‘de-jure’ accountability is often considered to be 
“narrowly functional, short term in orientation and favouring accountability to those 
stakeholders who control access to key resources” (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008, p803) or, in 
other words, as being hierarchical and formal and enacting a form of external oversight and 
control (Ebrahim, 2003, 2009; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; 
Stewart, 1984). Imposed accountability requirements can therefore encompass formal 
reporting requirements mandated by legislation. Felt accountability or ‘self’ accountability 
(Schlenker & Weigold 1989) is linked to aspects of ‘personal responsibility’ (Fry, 1995; 
Lindkvist & Llewellyn, 2003; Sinclair, 1995) and individual morality and values (Mulgan, 
2000). These factors are motivated by the ethical or value-based concerns of individuals 
within the organisations (Ebrahim, 2009; Fry, 1995) and in the case of religious 
organisations, these concerns are often their religious and ethical ideals. For Muslim NGOs, 
these ideals include values of Islamic accountability or those values that help to engender and 
reinforce practices consistent with Islamic notions of the good
2. We envisage adaptive ‘de-
facto’ regimes to be a hybrid of imposed and felt accountabilities, in which the relative 
dominance of either can shift over time (Ebrahim, 2003, 2009). 
 
2.1 Imposed accountability 
Imposed accountability refers to ‘being held responsible’ (O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015), 
incorporating the functional act of providing an account of one’s actions to a higher authority 
(Edwards & Hulmes, 1996) and providing an explanation of how relevant mandatory 
requirements have been followed (Najam, 1996, Stewart, 1984). This type of accountability is 
compliance-based and requires adherence to rules and regulations to assess performance, 
constrain activities and facilitate sanctions (O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Stewart, 1984) and 
is therefore most closely associated with ‘de-jure’ authority.  
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NGOs in the UK must abide by the Charities Act 2006 and the requirements of the 
Charity Commission (the regulator), in addition to the requirements of any other funding 
bodies and/or organisations of which they are members
3
. The increase in the receipt of 
funding from the government and other institutional subvention (such as the UN and other 
grant-making bodies), as well as the expansion of the scope, scale and range of services 
provided by faith-based organisations, has inevitably resulted in increased expectations of 
organisational effectiveness and efficiency. There is also greater demand for higher standards 
of fiduciary responsibility and financial management, along with mandates for performance 
evaluation and public reporting (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a, b).  
This change has also meant that religious NGO organisations must now clothe 
themselves in management tools and trappings similar to their secular and for-profit 
counterparts to remain legitimate. For Muslim NGOs, adhering to imposed accountability 
requirements is given even more importance because compliance can provide a level of 
legitimacy to their activities. Given the additional level of scrutiny under which many 
Muslim NGOs find themselves
4
 (Belaon, 2014; Benthall, 2016), compliance can indicate 
stability and sustainability for their ongoing humanitarian activities.  
 
2.2 Felt accountability 
Felt accountability refers to ‘feeling responsible’ (O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015), and it is 
closely linked to internal aspects of personal conscience and is driven by adherence to the 
internal, moral and ethical values of individuals (Harmon & Mayer, 1986) rather than purely 
organisational concerns (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). Fry (1995, p.188) argued that “this 
sense of accountability extends beyond what would normally be seen as a job or role 
boundary … the accountability becomes nurturing and enabling and responsibility is truly 
felt”. The nurturing and enabling nature of felt accountability develops because, at its core, 
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“accountability is a social acknowledgement and an insistence that one’s actions make a 
difference to both self and others” (Roberts, 1991, p. 365). A well-developed sense of felt 
accountability will cause individuals to be honest with themselves and be answerable and 
responsible for what they say and do, as well as having the ability to look beyond the 
immediate moment to consider the consequences. Therefore, it also allows individuals to be 
accountable to ‘themselves’ by seeking to align their own values, mission and culture with 
that of the organisation (O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Shearer, 2002; Sinclair, 1995). Felt 
accountability therefore replaces concerns of meeting imposed targets and curtailing activities 
with aligning the individual expectations of mission and goals with those of the organisation 
(Fry, 1995). O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015, p41) noted how felt accountability regimes allow 
for a more ‘personalised flow of information’, in which ‘a sense of trust’ is developed 
between organisational members, allowing for a shared vision of collective responsibility for 
the mission and objectives to emerge (Ebrahim, 2003, 2009; Najam, 1996; O’Dwyer & 
Boomsma, 2015).  
Within religious organisations, religious norms and values often provide a guide for 
what is considered acceptable behaviour. They help individuals to function ethically and 
responsibly, even when there is no other person to observe, monitor or hold them responsible 
due to the belief in an all-powerful, all-seeing higher entity (Clark & Dawson, 1996; 
Parboteeah, Hoegl & Cullen, 2008). Felt accountability embedded in religious values can 
therefore take on transcendent qualities.  
In reality, all organisations have some aspects of felt and imposed accountability 
regimes that are operational. The extent to which a type of accountability is dominant and the 
form that it takes will depend on the type of organisation, wider societal factors and the 
success of managers in balancing externally imposed accountability demands with internally 
driven responsibilities (Fry, 1995).  
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2.3 Adaptive accountability 
Adaptive accountability “seeks to integrate the moral and ethical focus of felt accountability 
with the instrumental focus of imposed accountability” (Ebrahim, 2009; O’Dwyer & 
Boomsma, 2015, p.42).  Similar to felt accountability, the focus of this accountability regime 
is linked to the underlying vision, mission and key activities of the organisation.  However, 
the long-term mission achievement and performance measurement is more formalised and 
prominent than in felt accountability regimes but not as much as with imposed accountability 
regimes (Ebrahim, 2009). In addition, adaptive accountability regimes allow for the demands 
of funders and beneficiaries to be prioritised by ensuring that the accountability of mission 
achievement in particular, is focused on those constituents whom NGOs aim to assist, such as 
beneficiaries or their representatives (Ebrahim, 2009). As O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015, 
p.40) emphasised, “unlike felt accountability regimes, adaptive regimes avoid over-relying 
on an NGO’s internally focused interpretation of whether it is achieving its mission … and 
embrace a combination of formal instrumental accountability mechanisms, such as 
performance measurement standards, and informal mechanisms…” 
Although the UK NGO sector is relatively under-regulated compared to other sectors 
(e.g., the finance industry), the increased media and regulatory attention paid to Muslim 
NGOs (Belaon, 2014; Benthall, 2016) indicates that their accountability regimes are likely to 
be dominated by imposed accountabilities, compared to other religious NGOs. However, 
given the Islamic religious nature of the organisations, felt accountability likely plays a large 
role in motivating organisational actors to strive towards mission achievement.  In other 
words, a strong sense of felt accountability driven by religious beliefs and values should help 
individuals to fulfil mission achievement. We therefore envisage that de-facto adaptive 
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accountability regimes have a strong religious/Islamic influence, focused on ensuring both 
mission achievement and imposed accountabilities.  
 
2.4 An Islamic perspective on accountability  
Studies exploring the Islamic theoretical perspective in accounting have suggested there is 
potential to learn from this religious stance.  For example in relation to issues such as 
accounting for the environment (Kamla, Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006) and more recently in 
relation to the Islamic finance and banking (Kamla & Alsoufi, 2015; Riaz, Burton & Monk, 
2017).   The Islamic perspective is therefore an important consideration when examining 
issues of accountability within Muslim organisations. The principles that underlie Islamic 
theology and in particular the concept of accountability in Islam are the notions of tawhid 
(the unity of Allah), amanah (trust) and khalifah (viceregency). Tawhid refers to the belief in 
the oneness of God and the total submission of oneself to God’s will; it indicates that 
Muslims must devote themselves to God in all aspects of life (Chapra, 2008). God is the 
ultimate owner of everything, and the role of humans is to act as His vicegerents (khalifah) 
on earth (Lewis, 2001, 2006). Humans are entrusted with family, resources, knowledge and 
property as a trust (amanah) from God. Hence, they must ensure that they perform their 
duties with care because they will be held to account for them after death, as it is believed 
one’s behaviour and actions in this world have direct effects on his/her reward or punishment 
in the hereafter. The word ‘account’ itself, or hesab, is referred to more than eighty times in 
the Quran, signifying the importance of being responsible and giving an account of one’s 
actions (Lewis, 2006). Consequently, the belief in the Day of Judgement is at the centre of 
the Islamic concept of accountability, and the Quran repeatedly refers to this day as the Day 
of Accountability: 
“On the day when every soul will be confronted with all the good it has done and all 
the evil it has done, it will wish there were a great distance between it and its evil. But 
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Allah cautions you (to fear) Him. And Allah is full of kindness to those that serve 
Him.” (3:30) 
 
“to Allah belongeth all that is in the heavens and on earth. Whether ye show what is 
in your minds or conceal it, Allah calleth you to account for it” (2:284).  
 
Consequently, the accountability relationship in Islam can be envisaged as a threefold 
relationship between oneself, God and society. The primary objective of accountability in 
Islam is to fulfil accountability to God (aspects of amanah and khalifah). Given the 
transcendent nature of this responsibility, accountability is enacted via fulfilment of 
accountability to the self (ruhiyah) and in ensuring that one is responsible for ones actions in 
relation to this responsibility (masuliyah). Both aspects are linked to the moral and ethical 
behaviour of the individual. In an organisational context, ruhiyah is concerned with an 
individual’s belief in how (s)he accounts for her/his actions towards God, constantly 
enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, whilst masuliyah is concerned with 
how one undertakes the responsibility that one is given and the societal implications of one’s 
actions towards this responsibility (Beekun & Badawi, 2005). Hence, an individual can fulfil 
his/her role as a vicegerent and thus his/her accountability to God by ensuring s(he) remains 
faithful to both their ruhiyah and masuliyah. Consequently, a person’s relationship with her-
/himself and other individuals/society should mirror his/her relationship with God.  
This concept suggests that Islam regulates all spheres of life, and the concept of 
accountability is not limited to personal and spiritual aspects but extends to all dealings and 
interactions that a Muslim undertakes at the personal or organisational level. In this manner, 
all forms of accountability activities are ultimately acts of worship because all actions are 
undertaken to please God and to ensure that one is not punished in the hereafter.  
 
3. Muslim NGOs in the UK 
12 
 
The largest of the Muslim NGOs operating in the UK were largely established by second-
generation Muslims, who were born and raised in the UK. This generation had looser ties 
with the countries of their parents’ origin, identifying themselves more with the Islamic 
religion than with their cultural identity
5
 (Roy, 2002; Seliger, 2004).  This was partly an 
attempt to overcome the erosion of their traditional identity, as they could no longer identify 
themselves with the country of their parents origin.   Cordier (2009) explained how this new 
generation of Muslims had a different sense of solidarity and charity than their parents. 
Whereas first-generation immigrants looked to their countries of origin to engage in 
charitable giving, second-generation immigrants had no such preference to restrict their 
donations to one country or ethnic group but rather sought to give to areas with most need. 
This difference created the ground for the emergence of Muslim NGOs and the development 
of their funding base (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2009). Furthermore, whereas previous 
generations of Muslim immigrants were mostly factory workers and shopkeepers, the current 
third/fourth generations of Muslims are more educated and career driven, leading to a small 
but growing Muslim middle class in the UK (MCB, 2015), the members of which having 
inevitably more financial means and a more global perspective than their parents
6
.  
The role of Muslim NGOs in the UK has further strengthened due to the Islamic 
requirements of charitable giving. There are three main types of Islamic charity: waqf 
(endowment of property or money): sadaqah (voluntary charity) and zakah (annual 
compulsory charity of 2.5% of one’s assets). In non-Islamic countries, it is only private 
organisations that are able to handle such donations, especially the zakah, due to certain 
requirements on distribution. Hence, whilst the first generation tended to give zakah through 
a local mosque or in their country of origin, later generations, with fewer ties to their places 
of origin, tend to donate zakah to aid organisations in their country of residence (Benthall & 
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Bellion-Jourdan, 2009) with the understanding that it will be spent in the areas of most need 
globally.  
 
4. Literature review on accountability and religious NGOs 
Surveying the scant NGO literature suggests that research examining NGO accountability is 
rather embryonic. The existing research on NGO accountability theorises the extent to which 
and to whom NGOs should be held accountable (Ebrahim, 2003, 2009; Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2006a, b) and examines the emergence and impact of various accountability 
mechanisms (Ebrahim, 2009; Goddard & Assad, 2006; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008).  There 
is also a small literature developing around the social and environmental consideration of 
NGOs (Momin, 2013; O’Dwyer, Unerman, & Bradley, 2005; Tilt, 1994).  Specifically, issues 
of accountability have been explored within developmental organisations (Goddard & Assad, 
2006) and advocacy organisations (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006), amongst others. This extant 
literature suggests that increasing demands for accountability are not necessarily healthy for 
NGOs. There is evidence of inappropriate accountability mechanisms damaging, rather than 
enhancing, the social and environmental benefits that NGOs bring (Najam, 1996; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2007, 2008). The literature also suggests over-dominance of upward hierarchical 
accountability to donors at the expense of wider holistic accountability incorporating 
beneficiaries, resulting in NGO mission drift (Ebrahim, 2003, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2007). The literature however lacks a situation-specific focus on NGOs, their activities and 
their identity in terms of the accountability demands that are placed upon them. 
Similarly, the literature examining religious organisations
7
 has also been limited. This 
literature has primarily been concerned with understanding the interaction between 
accounting and religious beliefs and exploring any tensions between secular accounting 
activities and sacred religious activities (Booth, 1993; Hardy & Ballis, 2005, 2013; Jacobs, 
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2005; Laughlin, 1990). This literature has examined the interaction of religion and accounting 
within various organisations, such as churches (Booth, 1993; Laughlin, 1990; Parker, 2001; 
2002), Muslim religious councils (Abdul-Rahman & Goddard, 1998) and Buddhist and 
Hindu temples (Jayasinghe & Soobarayen, 2009). Prior studies have also focused on religious 
communities, including Jacobs and Walker’s (2004) study of the Iona community and 
Quattrone’s (2004) exploration of the accounting practice of the Jesuits. 
Some of these studies found the actual practice of accountability to be separated from 
the religious ideals of the organisation (Booth, 1993; Laughlin, 1990), with Hardy and Ballis 
(2013) suggesting that religious organisations tend to focus on promoting their sacred 
agendas, rather than adhering to accountability templates, and on generating accounts that are 
not fully compatible with formal reporting requirements. This finding was further evidenced 
in a recent study by Yasmin, Haniffa and Hudaib (2014), who found religious charity 
organisations to have poorly communicated accountability practices. Even in instances in 
which religious motivation was found to be central to accounting and accountability 
practices, internal organisational structures were found to focus heavily on informal ‘de-
facto’ accountability structures and activities (see for example Hardy & Ballis, 2013; Jacobs 
& Walker; 2004 and Quattrone, 2004).  
These studies have largely been undertaken in Christian organisations; therefore, the 
proclaimed dichotomy between the sacred and profane activities of the organisation is not 
equally applicable to Muslim religious organisations.  Therefore, in the case of Muslim 
religious organisations, Abdul-Rahman and Goddard (1998, p. 197) suggest: "the separation 
between the sacred and secular activities is not as significant as that experienced by western 
Christian churches". This difference is due to the emphasis placed by the Islamic religion on 
the non-separation of sacred and secular aspects of life (Lewis, 2006), which suggests that 
studying Muslim NGOs could provide a complementary understanding of how accounting 
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and accountability interplay within a religious setting, comparable to the narrative provided 
in the current literature.  
 
5. Research methods 
The objective of this paper is to deepen and advance our understanding of the accountability 
practices in place within Muslim NGOs. In particular, we want to focus on how Muslim 
NGOs manage their externally imposed accountability with their internally generated 
religious accountabilities. This method then allows for a rich contextualisation to be 
developed regarding the interplay between different accountability regimes within Muslim 
NGOs. It was envisaged that the research interest would only be transparently observable in 
those organisations that were sufficiently large to have an established accountability and 
governance structure and that were subject to Charity Commission regulation (Pettigrew, 
1988). Hence, those NGOs registered with the Charity Commission and with incomes greater 
than £500,000 per annum were chosen. Established organisations were sought because they 
were expected to have established programmes and formal structures. Formal structures 
implied that a functioning accounting system and accompanying governance frameworks 
were anticipated.  
Access was negotiated through informal contacts in the first instance via telephone 
and e-mail. This negotiation process took 3-4 months from the initial contact to the first 
interviews being held. Twenty-five NGOs were initially contacted, of which seven 
responded, and interviews were conducted in six of these organisations. The interviewees 
were purposefully chosen (Patton, 1990) to ensure that key informants within the 
organisations were interviewed. This choice meant that people who were either experts in the 
area or privy to key information required for the research were interviewed. The interviews 
were conducted until data saturation was reached; hence, a total of fourteen senior 
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management, executive directors and trustees
8
 were on the final interviewee list. All of the 
participants were of the Muslim faith, and all (except one woman) were men. Table 1 
presents an overview of the NGOs and the number of interviewees in each organisation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Appropriate topics and interview questions were identified from the research aims of the 
project and were revised during the interviews as new themes became apparent (Miles & 
Huberman, 2004). Given the nature of the topic, it was important to address issues that arose 
during the interviews on an ongoing basis (Adler & Adler, 2001); the researchers were also 
aware they might not be able to interview the same person again due to busy schedules. No 
definition of accountability was imposed on the interviewees, and questions were asked in a 
conversational manner (Patton, 2002). The interviews lasted between 60 and 120 minutes. All 
of the interviews were conducted in the participants’ own offices or meeting rooms within the 
NGO headquarters. All of the participants and organisations were guaranteed confidentiality; 
therefore, the transcripts were codified, and the codes were used in the final analysis. All of 
the interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed as soon as possible after the interview.  
The NVivo software package was used to catalogue, collect and sort the interview 
transcripts, interview notes and documentary evidence for analysis. Data were analysed on a 
thematic basis (Crabtree & Miller, 1992). Themes were identified from the data, which were 
then used to form a coding template summarising all of the important themes into a 
meaningful and useful format. The coded data were then subsequently analysed using 
narrative analysis techniques, which included identifying commonalities and differences, 
exploring recurring themes and patterns, and making notes of particular key words and 
phrases. The data analysis was undertaken alongside data collection (after the first two 
17 
 
interviews had been undertaken) because this step enabled further exploration of emerging 
themes in subsequent interviews.  
 
6. Findings 
In this section, we analyse the accountability practices of Muslim NGOs. Guided by our 
research framework, we structured our narratives based on imposed, felt and adaptive 
accountabilities.  
 
6.1 Muslim NGOs and imposed accountabilities  
Ongoing regulatory changes (Charity Commission Statement of Recommended Practice 
[SORP] 2005/2008), as well as institutional funder requirements, have significant impacts on 
the manner in which NGOs keep records and prepare their accounts. Although the funder 
accountability requirements would be the same across the sector regardless of faith, certain 
regulatory requirements have particularly targeted the Muslim NGO sector. Fear of 
compliance checks and ensuring legitimacy were identified amongst the main reasons for 
ensuring proper record keeping and procedural adequacies. This finding is not surprising 
given the large numbers of Muslim NGOs (38% of the total enquiries) being investigated by 
the Charity Commission (Belaon, 2014) for possible financial irregularities. Muslim NGOs 
showed keen awareness of complying with their imposed regulatory and funder 
accountability requirements to maintain their organisational legitimacy. Increased reporting 
requirements and funder obligations have largely had positive effects in helping the 
organisations to strengthen their internal processes, yet certain indirect legislative acts have 
had a detrimental impact on their mission and activities by curbing their ability to deliver in 
certain situations.  
 
18 
 
Regulatory accountability 
Although the NGO sector is relatively less regulated than for-profit organisations, the Charity 
Commission’s (2005) regulations in relation to reporting and accounting and the SORP 
“…have had a significant impact on the way we keep records and prepare accounts” [SM5]. 
In addition, indirect non-accounting/accountability legislation, such as the Counter Terrorism 
Act (2008), the Bribery Act (2010) and the Money Laundering Regulations (2007) have also 
caused Muslim NGOs to significantly change their organisational practices, although they are 
not directly aimed at NGOs: 
“We are now living in a globalised world and having to implement legislation for 
anti-money laundering or antiterrorism to identify the end user. So we have to know 
how the funds are going to be used at the very end, not only where they are processed 
and how they are remitted. We also must know to whom they are remitted and to see 
actually where and how they have been spent.” [SM5]  
 
The UK has a strict Bribery Act (2010). If any of the employees of a UK-based organisation, 
in any part of the world, takes or offers a bribe, then the organisation is liable. Interviewees 
emphasised that their organisations were strengthening their procedures in their field offices 
in relation to this Act and raising awareness of a zero-tolerance policy: 
“An important component of our work is also to make sure that people in the field are 
aware of it. There are sufficient notices up in the offices to say we don’t give or take 
bribes and that people are trained and that any sort of transaction that could be 
deemed as a bribe is stopped ... The Act mandates zero tolerance. The amount doesn’t 
matter. We would have to reconsider working in any country where we are not able to 
abide by this Act.” [SM6]  
 
The Counter Terrorism Act (2008) has had the effect of causing all funds coming in and out 
of any organisation that is Islamic in nature to face more scrutiny. Due to this scrutiny, all of 
the respondents pointed out how their organisations now had extensive written processes and 
lines of communication. They all ensured that they kept an audit trail for their transactions, 
and no transactions were made outside of the electronic banking system.  
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 This added scrutiny has also had a direct impact on international fund transfer 
activities. The interviewees expressed some frustrations because they sometimes could not 
obtain the money sent for projects in host countries on a timely basis due to zealous checking 
on NGOs: 
“There have been instances … where it has taken virtually months. You can imagine 
if you are trying to send funds for a famine in Somalia, and your funds are held for a 
month ... it can quite easily turn into a life or death scenario for the people who have 
been impacted.” [SM2] 
 
There was quite a strong feeling from all of the respondents that this additional burden 
unduly targeted Muslim NGOs and had a detrimental impact on their humanitarian activities, 
especially across the Middle East and Syria. 
 
Funder accountability 
 In the case of institutional funders, the contractual obligation upon organisations to act in a 
certain manner is more explicit and formalised, and such imposed accountability is not 
specific to Muslim NGOs but applies to the sector as a whole. This obligation entails detailed 
reports of activities, regular reviews and the production of financial statements, which are 
usually based on a template provided by the funders. Whilst all of the respondents agreed that 
this monitoring process by funders was a necessary part of discharging imposed 
accountability, they also felt that it was burdensome in some instances and sometimes placed 
too much strain on available resources in serving beneficiaries. This outcome was especially 
pertinent in the case of smaller NGOs:  
“We work with Echo… it’s the humanitarian branch of the EU. When they give 
you funding, they are quite strict. They’ll come and check and do full audits. 
They might come to the office and say -- the last few years we've done six 
projects with you, and we want to see this and this and this project. Bring the 
documents, bring your procedures, and bring your controls. They'll spend two 
weeks and go through everything. Then they will say this is not right, but this is 
okay.” [SM6]. 
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“And when you get the money, there are a lot of strings attached to it, a lot of 
paperwork attached to it.” [ED4] 
 
Institutional funders realise the impact that their demands have on increasing overhead costs 
and often consider this demand when providing funds. These additional demands in turn 
actually have a positive effect in helping NGOs to strengthen their internal processes and 
procedures. One of the NGOs has a Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA) funding 
agreement with the Department for International Development (DfiD), which is specifically 
aimed at core capacity building and is not project related. One respondent explained how his 
organisation received grants every year to improve systems and processes, and in turn, DfiD 
carried out audits to determine whether the money provided had actually improved the 
procedures. With this particular organisation, institutional funding has had a direct, positive 
impact on its level of accountability.  
 
6.2 Felt accountability and the religious spirit 
There was a consistent feeling amongst all of the interviewees that the main inspiration for 
their activities stemmed from their faith, consistent with prior studies (Lindkvist & 
Llewellyn, 2003; Sinclair, 1995) in which religious belief coupled with strong moral and 
ethical values was found to be a strong driver of ‘felt’ accountability (Clark & Dawson, 1996; 
Phipps, 2001; Walker, Smither & DeBode, 2011). In terms of religious belief, the individuals 
interviewed expressed a strong belief in their sense of accountability to Allah (amanah and 
khalifah). This religious belief was evident in the strong ethical and moral values espoused by 
interviewees and in their desire to help beneficiaries.  
 
Accountability as worship (ibadah) 
Individuals were keen to point out how they ensured that they did not take liberties with NGO 
resources. Even small details, such as taking a postage stamp for personal use or charging 
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one’s personal phone battery, were things that individuals felt they would be held accountable 
for by Allah in their role as vicegerents on earth: 
“…Because we are going to be held accountable on the Day of Judgement for 
where that money has gone.” [ED5] 
 
“During my time, we limited our spending … we were very, very miserly about 
the whole thing because ultimately you are answerable to Allah; there are no 
two ways about it.” [ED2] 
 
“The money that we're handling is an amanah, it’s a trust, and so if you give a 
pound, I need to ensure that I'm spending it in the right area and according to 
how you’ve entrusted the organisation to spend it.” [SM4] 
 
The concept of ruhiyah, i.e., that everyone is accountable for his/her actions or inactions on 
the Day of Judgement (Abdul-Rahman & Goddard, 1998), was found to heavily influence all 
of those people whom we interviewed. Individuals endeavoured to work in a manner that 
accepted responsibility for affecting the lives of others and to work towards excellence 
(ehsan) in their activities as part of their self-accountability (ruhiyah). They also had a strong 
belief that all of their actions were being guided by Allah:  
“So I personally focus on this thing on a daily basis. I evaluate myself at the end 
of the day ... I ask myself, How did I do? What did I achieve? What could I do 
better? What I do personally is that I go out of the way and do some of the things 
that I’m not asked to do ... like working on weekends and working on Eid. So then 
I can compensate for a gap or weakness where I wasn’t able to deliver. There are 
a lot of ways, you know, but that's just my way of being accountable to myself and 
to my Allah.” [SM1] 
 
“I believe as a Muslim person that Allah has love for me and for His people. Even 
when we turn away from Him and forget everything that we’re blessed with, He 
still loves us. Look what He does for us ... look how many times we turn away 
from Him, and He’s so merciful to us; we’re so blessed. Each time I pray, I pray 
to Allah to make me a source of help to those in need because I know He hasn’t 
forgotten me then. And as long as He keeps that door open, I know that I have a 
chance for redemption. I’m not doing it like a trade-off… because it’s just there ... 
If I see human suffering I just can’t turn my back; it’s just the way I am.” [T1] 
 
‘Felt’ accountability was found to be strengthened by a desire to help humanity; thus, 
employment in the charity sector was portrayed as a ‘calling or sense of duty’, rather than a 
22 
 
job. This desire to help humanity stemmed from Islamic belief, and the interviewees felt that 
there was ‘barakah’ (blessing) in the work they were doing and that their deeds would be 
accepted by Allah. Hence, intrinsic reward helped ‘‘crowd out’’ the extrinsic reward of the 
job role (Houston, 2006). In many cases, the founding of the NGO itself was based on strong 
‘self-accountability’ motivations: 
“I was a civil servant, and then I became an international civil servant, and then 
I joined a charity called the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, and I sat 
on the board. So I said, let me now try and go into running a charity as the CEO 
and try and bring my experience of working in different places and different 
entities and organisations and see if I could contribute something for 
humanity.” [ED3] 
 
This finding was also evident in the manner in which the majority of interviewees began their 
involvement with NGOs. For example, all of the senior managers and executives interviewed 
worked as volunteers before becoming permanent staff. Moreover, some of these senior staff 
were trained in a different profession (e.g., lawyer, teacher and software engineer) and gave 
up these jobs to work full time within the sector: 
“My job was as a schoolteacher, and I always wanted to do something where I 
was helping others. I really wanted to work helping others and not just working 
in a factory producing widgets. I genuinely wanted to make a difference really.” 
[SM2] 
 
 
Felt accountability and beneficiary trust  
Beneficiary trust in NGOs is important for effective aid delivery as an important element of 
effective service delivery and for discharging accountability. The interviews suggest that felt 
accountability motivations were the main drivers for gaining beneficiary trust because no 
formal mechanisms existed for this. Some of the respondents clearly stated they would not 
work in an area where the beneficiaries did not trust them, and they felt that this area was 
where their faith played an important role:  
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“If I went on the ground and the communities didn’t trust me, I wouldn’t work 
there ... If that community is going to trust me to be there … I’m acting as a 
lifeline for them … and if I get a no, we don’t need your help, then I should just 
walk away.” [T1]  
 
Beneficiary trust was gained by assuring beneficiaries that they wanted to help them by 
empathising with their situations and by listening to their concerns through the common 
values and beliefs that they shared. A strong respect for human dignity was identified as 
important when addressing beneficiaries:  
“… because trust is absolutely key and critical to effective humanitarian 
intervention, once you've created trust between the beneficiaries and [charity 
X], you get a better understanding of what is needed, and that interface uses the 
participatory approach, using the communities as our catalysts to be able to 
bring about humanitarian intervention.” [ED3]  
 
 “I think if a flood came and all my things were, God forbid, swept away, it 
doesn't mean I don't have my dignity and respect. I would still expect people to 
talk to me. I would not expect them to throw a parcel at my feet. I would expect 
them to ask me first how I feel, what I need. It's a grassroots approach… I think 
that is humanity, and that's how to treat people.” [T1] 
 
The respondents also emphasised that those working with beneficiaries must be committed to 
the cause and to the mission and values of the organisations: hence, aspects of ri'ayah 
(professionalism) and tabligh (ability to deliver) were reflected as important in gaining trust. 
They need to share the same values, understand suffering and feel the pain of those they are 
trying to help: 
“What you are doing is basically helping them get out of that misery, and you 
have to be able to cope with those kinds of situations. You meet people who have 
walked for days and weeks barefoot and they haven't eaten. Mothers, girls, sisters 
who have been abused… it's very psychological. It is very difficult for the one who 
is suffering from it, but it is also difficult for the one who is listening, trying to 
help.” [SM1] 
 
Whilst all organisations profess themselves to be Muslim in ethos and have Islam as the main 
driver of their humanitarian activities, the respondents were very keen to point out that 
despite misconceptions that persist in society (e.g., that their activities are limited to Muslims 
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only), they all were humanitarian organisations and therefore helped the needy regardless of 
faith: 
“The inspiration is that, from the faith, we are a faith-based organisation, but that 
does not mean that we do not reach others … So it is a Muslim charity but works for 
all. Its agenda is very, very clear… it is relief development and empowerment, 
wherever they are.” [ED2] 
 
“Many of our large charity organisations responded to the Haiti disaster to show the 
wider community that they were all inclusive and ‘not just here to help Muslims’.” 
[ED4] 
 
However, many beneficiaries in areas of conflict prefer dealing with organisations from their 
own faith (Benthall, 2016). Similarly, regional ‘gatekeepers’ (e.g., the Taliban in 
Afghanistan) are usually suspicious of other faith or nonfaith organisations and can restrict 
access or create security risks for ground staff. Hence, Muslim organisations have better 
access to majority Muslim areas, which at the moment are also areas where there is the 
greatest need for humanitarian aid.  
 
6.3 De-facto adaptive accountability  
The findings suggested that Muslim NGOs have a complex relationship with imposed 
accountabilities, with accounting requirements having a positive effect on improving 
accountability practice, whilst non-accounting requirements became overly burdensome. 
Despite this outcome, the main motivation for day to day activities within the NGOs 
stemmed from their Islamic ethos and a strong sense of felt accountability. To navigate these 
various accountabilities, Muslim NGOs developed internal, religiously derived frameworks, 
relying extensively on their faith identity to maintain their accountability relationships with 
their donors.  
For example, one organisation was in the process of setting up a Shariah advisory 
board as a consultancy body for its trustees. Traditionally, Shariah boards have been the 
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remits of Islamic financial institutions, in which there is greater uncertainty over the 
permissibility of certain financial transactions (see for example Ullah, Jamali & Harwood, 
2014). However, given the wide range of income that large Muslim NGOs generate, their 
subsequent expenditures and investments have also come under scrutiny within the Muslim 
community, with concerns raised by some conservative Muslim groups over the overheads 
being generated
9
. The Shariah advisory body would therefore advise trustees regarding the 
permissibility of certain organisational expenditures and activities.  
Another organisation was working on developing an Islamic accountability 
framework to which all of its members could adhere to. The organisational members felt that 
it was very important for them to show to both their donors and beneficiaries their key 
religious values that ‘make us Muslim’ [ED2]. They felt that doing so would allow the 
organisation to be accountable to Allah in the form of their Islamic values and mission. 
“So I think by bringing in an Islamic accountability framework, we will be bringing in 
a very small Islamic chunk of responsibility and saying this is added to the universal 
principles of accountability and responsibility. We will be calling it practising Muslim 
ethos and values.” [ED1] 
 
They had already floated the idea with representatives of the UNHCR, who thought it would 
be “a very unique idea” because other NGOs were mainly concerned with secular standards 
of adherence.  
The focus of these new accountability regimes was therefore designed to link the 
underlying vision, mission and key activities of the organisation with the members’ Muslim 
faith. The organisations were very much aware of the criticisms they were facing because of 
their faith, but they also realised the need to proudly show that they were Muslim 
organisations and to counter any negative sentiment by applying the positive ethos of Islamic 
values and ensuring that they actively proved their accountability through these legitimising 
endeavours. 
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Responding to socio-political narratives in the media 
In response to renewed media attention being paid to them, Muslim NGOs were examining 
new ways to adapt their responses to accountability, utilising sophisticated external 
communication tools. There has been an enormous resurgence of interest in Muslim NGOs in 
recent months (Belaon, 2014). Post-9/11, the focus on Muslims and Muslim-specific 
organisations increased tremendously, with increase in Muslim-specific reporting up by 
500% in some newspapers (Allen, 2012). Although all of this reporting was not necessarily 
negative, a significant amount of the content is related to matters of terrorism, threats and so 
on
10
, leading to arguments that media coverage is causing all Muslims to become 
homogenised, being seen as having the same attributes, qualities, capabilities and 
characteristics (Poole, 2002), most of which are extremely negative (Sardar, 2002). This trend 
led to warnings in the Claystone Report (Belaon, 2014) that Muslim NGOs are being 
‘disproportionately investigated and monitored’ (Guardian, 2014, 2015). 
These concerns were also found to be prominent in the NGOs, with almost all of them 
having a specific department to address media-related queries. Consequently, organisational 
members stated that they had to work much harder to prove their transparency and 
accountability:  
“It is a big issue, and unfortunately, being one the leading Muslim organisations in 
the sector, we are always the ones in the spotlight. It has led us to be much more 
aware of our activities and how we operate.” [ED1] 
 
“We get this all the time. If you go on our Web site, we have just produced this video, 
which tackles the whole expenditure issue, so we explain how every penny of your 
pound is spent”. [SM3]  
 
 
One of the leading NGO interviewed has had its name cleared in a terrorism funding-related 
case, in which individuals had raised money for terrorism using their brand name. This case 
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had led the NGO to suffer from much negative media attention, which inevitably affected 
donations. Although the NGO was fully cleared, the members felt they were dealt with 
‘unjustly’ by the media because the undue attention led to several more Charity Commission 
investigations, from which they were also later cleared.  
 
Donors, Islamic identity and accountability  
It was found that the faith identity of Muslim NGOs provided them with an additional layer 
of legitimacy from their Muslim donors. Prior research has found that religious organisations 
are intrinsically trusted by their donors to spend donations according to the spirit of the 
religion (Hardy & Ballis, 2013; Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009). Consistent with Yasmin et 
al. (2014), in their study of the communicated accountability practices of Muslim and 
Christian charities, our research also found that Muslim NGOs had relatively weak demands 
from their donors for information, primarily because, in Islam, it is presumed that the 
‘reward’ of giving to charity is recorded for the actual act of giving and is not based on 
subsequent distribution (Lewis, 2001, 2006). Therefore, the onus is left on the NGO to ensure 
that its donations are properly distributed: 
“Because the religion says once you've given your charity you've got your 
reward then and there. So how the funds are handled within the organisation 
will not impact the reward that you get.” [SM4]. 
 
However, the drawback of this belief was the over-emphasis placed by donors on the 
overhead spending ratios of the NGOs. The respondents noted how their donors were more 
concerned with the issue of how much they were spending on overheads than on actual 
activity expenditures because many donors believed the amount of their reward (from God) 
was linked to the maximum amount being given directly to beneficiaries. This belief 
impacted the smaller organisations and prevented internal capacity building. As a result, the 
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majority of NGOs were engaging in educational drives to inform donors of the need for 
overhead costs.  
Despite the absence of pressures from donors to report, all of the respondents believed 
that accountability and communication with donors were extremely important, and all of the 
organisations regularly sent updates to donors conveying the projects that had been delivered 
and how the organisation had managed their donations. For example, a publication by one of 
the NGOs reads:  
“1 million-plus vulnerable people received Qurbani meat in 40 countries, 7900 units 
of Qurbani delivered around the world, 125,000 Palestinian refugees received long-
lasting can-packed Qurbani …”  
 
The majority of this communication was also deliberately timed during Ramadhan and Dhul 
Hijjah (Islamic holy months) to indirectly remind donors of their religious obligations to give 
to charity.  
 
7 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper sought to deepen and advance our understanding of the dejure and defacto 
accountability processes and practices within Muslim NGOs. To conceptualise this process, 
we drew on a framework comprised of three ‘ideal types’ of non-profit accountability 
regimes - the imposed, felt and adaptive accountabilities employed by O’Dwyer and 
Boomsma (2015). We adopted this framework to recognise the complicated and continuing 
balancing act in which NGOs engage to balance their multifaceted accountabilities. We 
extended the framework to encompass religious values to acknowledge both the de-jure and 
de-facto accountability practices of Muslim NGOs operating in the UK. 
Although some prior literature on religious organisations (Booth, 1993; Hardy & 
Ballis, 2013; Laughlin, 1990) has suggested there can be a divide between the imposed 
requirement of ‘secular’ accountability requirements and the religiously defined aspects of 
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felt accountability, our study found this not to be the case for Muslim NGOs, and we found 
no evidence of such a tension or divide. Our study found that imposed accounting and 
reporting requirements from both legislation and funders had positive effects in helping 
organisations strengthen their internal processes (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997). A strong 
overlap was found between felt accountability values and the need to provide better reporting 
and accountability to organisational stakeholders. An emphasis on their faith and self-
reflection (ruhiyah) enabled the respondents to view accountability activities as a form of 
worship (ibadah ), and hence on accounting and reporting, was viewed as part of fulfilling 
one’s responsibilities (masuliyah). This emphasis on faith was particularly important because 
the respondents felt that it helped them to build trust with their beneficiaries, thus providing 
them with greater ease in humanitarian aid delivery.  
Therefore, whilst prior research found that mission drift occurred due to a dominance 
of upward hierarchical accountability at the expense of holistic accountability (Ebrahim, 
2003, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007), our study suggests that Muslim NGOs are able to 
overcome the problem of mission drift by viewing their hierarchical accountability 
requirements as a form of worship encompassed within their holistic accountability dynamic. 
Thus, in Muslim NGOs, holistic accountability, driven by religious values and mission 
achievement, is not separate from hierarchical accountability; rather, it forms a part of the 
holistic accountability dynamic. These organisations ‘live and breathe’ their Islamic identity 
to ensure the sustainability of their activities. In fact, Muslim NGOs have sought to adapt 
their accountability-related activities by strengthening their Muslim identity through 
religiously defined formal accountability structures and processes and to appease their 
Muslim donor base. Thus, within Muslim NGOs, religious values are being used to redefine 
their internal understanding of accountability to strengthen their processes. Or, in other 
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words, the requirements of imposed accountability are being legitimated within the 
organisations using religiously defined frameworks. 
 Ongoing terrorist-related activity purportedly linked to the Islamic faith and the 
consequential resurgence of interest in Muslim NGOs are causing the organisations to face 
dilemmas not faced by other NGOs (Benthall, 2016). Our findings suggest that where direct 
accounting-driven and accounting-imposed requirements have strengthened internal 
accountability processes, indirect (non-accounting/accountability-related) regulatory 
requirements are actually hampering humanitarian activities due to the restrictions that these 
requirements place on where and how Muslim organisations can operate. This restriction has 
meant that the organisations must choose whether to stop operating in certain geographical 
regions and instead only work in ‘safe’ areas, where operational obstacles would not arise.  A 
similar theme is also reflected in the wider non-profit literature, in which research has found 
that imposed accountability requirements can hamper mission achievement by encouraging 
managers to concentrate on a narrow range of less risky activities (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer 
& Unerman, 2008). Whilst this body of research considers internal activities to have become 
risk-free, our findings extend this understanding to the external core humanitarian activities 
of NGOs as also becoming ‘safer’. Our findings therefore suggest that imposed 
accountability requirements have a radically different effect on Muslim NGOs due to their 
complex socio-political nature, compared to other religious and secular NGOs.  Thus for 
Muslim NGOs, their de-facto adaptive accountability regimes play an extremely important 
role in motivating internal accountability processes, as well as helping organisational 
survival. 
Thus, the practical implications of our findings suggest that strong internally 
generated accountabilities, especially those derived from felt accountability motivations can 
help NGOs mitigate unexpected concerns from the external environment.  In this regard, the 
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defacto accountability regimes of NGOs must be considered in relation to their dejure 
mechanisms to gain a more holistic appreciation of how such organisations manage various 
accountabilities.  Further, our findings seek to strengthen the argument that defacto 
accountability regimes, complemented by religious belief, can significantly enhance the 
legitimacy of NGO organisational practice from its beneficiaries and donor base.  Our 
findings also highlight how managers within Muslim NGOs need to be aware of the effect 
that external narratives may be having on the perceived image of their organisation. This may 
mean being more proactive in publicising their activities, creating relationships with key 
stakeholders and being more transparent in the communities in which they are based and 
operate.  
This paper has responded to calls for more detailed research into accountability within 
religious organisations (Quattrone, 2004) and has provided insight into the nature of 
accountability within one particular faith group that uses religious teachings to develop its 
own accountability frameworks. Future research could build on this study and take a wider 
stakeholder view of Muslim NGO accountability by examining its accountability relationship 
with funders, donors, regulators and the government in more depth. Future research could 
also consider whether these findings are specific to Muslim NGOs only or whether similar 
practices exist within other Muslim-specific organisations. This factor is especially pertinent 
given the distinctive nature of the operating model of NGOs, compared to business-specific 
entities. In addition, there is great need for accountability to be conceptualised in other 
religious NGOs operating in the UK. This research would provide a rich understanding of the 
accountability mosaic of UK-specific religious NGOs, the different pressures that they face, 
their responses and their relationships with mission achievement. For example, no studies 
have yet examined the Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Jewish religious NGOs of the UK.  
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Notes
                                                          
1
 The UK is officially a Christian country, although the last census in 2011 suggested an increase in 
the number of respondents who viewed themselves as having no religious affiliation, compared to 
2001.  
2
 We are grateful to one of our reviewers for elaborating on this point. 
3
 For example, the Fundraising Standards Board, Disasters Emergency Committee, Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership, and the Sphere Standards 
4
 See, for example ‘rambling about charity overheads’: http://uncultured.com/2010/09/26/rambling-
about-charity-overhead/ 
5
 Cultural identity here refers to the ethnic and/or national background, for example, British 
individuals of South Asian, African and/or Middle Eastern descent. 
6
 There are currently an estimated 2.7 million Muslims in the UK, just less than 5% of the total 
population of the UK, with 47% of these people born in the UK. Of these Muslims, 68% consider 
themselves to be Asian (MCB, 2015), reflecting the large economic migration wave of the 1950s and 
1960s from the South Asian subcontinent.  
7 The literature refers to religious organisations rather than religious NGOs as the focus of this 
literature being predominantly places of worship, such as churches, rather than wider non-profit 
organisations.  
8
 In larger charities, the role of the executive committee is similar to that of the board of directors in 
corporations, with senior managers working beneath them. Trustees play a role similar to non-
executive directors, but they are much more proactive and are responsible for advising directors about 
strategic directions with the responsibility lying with the directors regarding how the strategies are 
implemented. This role means that trustees are also very difficult to interview because they are often 
away in places where the majority of the organisation’s activities are undertaken. 
9
 See footnote 4. 
10
 See, for example: ‘Government donation to Muslim Charities Forum denounced as "madness"’ (The 
Telegraph, 23 Sep 2014); ‘Islamic charities in UK fear they are being unfairly targeted over 
extremism’ (The Guardian, 22 July 2015); ‘Fear of Muslims tearing British society apart’ (The 
Telegraph, 5 Oct 2014). 
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Table 1: An overview of the organisations 
Org.   Approx 
income 
level 
(yr end 
2014) 
Type of activity Countries 
of 
operation 
Main 
income 
streams 
Paid 
employees 
Trustees Interviews 
conducted 
Quotation 
codes* 
1 £0.54m Women and 
Children 
Emergency relief 
Education and 
healthcare 
 
Middle East 
South Asia 
Community 
fundraising 
Government 
grants  
 
3 3 3 T1 
SM1 
2 £0.63m Food and water 
Healthcare 
Education 
Emergency relief 
Sponsorship 
Construction 
 
Middle East 
South Asia 
Bosnia 
Africa 
UK 
Community 
fundraising  
government 
grants 
 
1 4 1 ED5 
3 £0.72m Education 
Emergency relief 
South Asia 
Africa 
Community 
fundraising 
 
0 3 1 ED4 
4 £3.23m Food and water 
Healthcare 
Education 
Emergency relief 
Sponsorship 
Microfinance 
Qurbani 
Waqf 
 
Middle East 
South Asia 
Bosnia 
Africa 
Burma 
Community 
fundraising  
Institutional 
funding 
Government 
grants 
 
1 5 1 SM5 
5 £34.7m Food and water 
Healthcare 
Education 
Shelter  
Emergency relief 
Sponsorship 
Microfinance 
Qurbani 
Waqf 
 
Middle East 
South Asia 
Bosnia 
Africa 
UK 
Burma 
Europe 
America 
Community 
fundraising  
Institutional 
funding 
Government 
grants 
 
110 6 4 ED2 
ED3 
SM6 
 
6 £99.1m Food and water 
Sustainable 
development 
Healthcare 
Education 
Emergency relief 
Sponsorship 
Microfinance 
Qurbani 
Waqf 
 
Middle East 
South Asia 
Bosnia 
Africa 
UK 
America 
Community 
fundraising, 
Institutional 
funding 
Government 
grants 
370 8 4 ED1 
SM2 
SM3 
SM4 
*Not all interviewees have been quoted 
